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Abstract
This paper assesses the long term impacts of an international transfer called
the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) mech-
anism, which aims at preserving tropical forests of the recipient economy.
This two-sector economy faces a dilemma between economic growth and de-
forestation. The rural sector can substitute reproducible capital for agricul-
tural land whereas the manufacturing sector only requires capital. The model
shows that the REDD mechanism has a non-monotonic effect on steady state
welfares. For low transfer schemes, the agricultural output increases with the
transfer even though less land is under cultivation. For high transfer schemes,
the increase in the transfer may not offset the decrease in the agricultural
output. The open-loop symmetric Nash equilibrium in a dynamic deforesta-
tion game predicts that redistributing the transfer among a finite number of
producers is less efficient in reducing deforestation than in the social opti-
mum.
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1. Introduction
Deforestation in the tropics is currently responsible for about a quar-
ter of total world carbon emissions and represents the main source of emis-
sions in some developing countries (Eliasch, 2008). Reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in developed countries while developing countries remain excluded
from the burden sharing agreement is unlikely to mitigate climate change ef-
ficiently. Because curbing deforestation has the potential to offer significant
emissions reductions in developing countries, it represents an opportunity
to bring developing countries into the international negotiations on climate
change. Forest abundant countries would likely agree to participate if they
would receive compensation for reducing deforestation that covers the oppor-
tunity cost of preserving the land in forest.1 The Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) mechanism offers a transfer that
provides the incentive to reduce deforestation in forest-abundant developing
countries. This transfer would have an impact on both the environment and
economic activities in the recipient country, given that land clearing is often
a fuel for growth (Naidoo, 2004).
This paper develops a growth model with land conversion dynamics in
a two-sector economy to analyze the role of a transfer mechanism that lim-
its agricultural land expansion. Whereas an unconditional transfer could
compensate the forest abundant country for its efforts in preserving forest
without creating any distortion, this paper focuses on a transfer that explic-
itly depends on environmental variables that are used for production. In a
small open economy that is initially endowed with a large stock of forest,
deforestation occurs due to the higher returns of land converted to agricul-
ture (Hartwick et al., 2001). Aiming at reducing the relative returns from
agricultural land compared to forest, the REDD mechanism also creates a
price distortion between the two productive factors, agricultural land and
capital. This price distortion may be good for the recipient economy if it off-
sets a previously existing distortion, i.e., if farmers would deforest too much
1 During the UNFCCC conference of the Parties in Bali in December 2007, the United
Nations agreed that climate policies must include a mechanism aiming at reducing tropical
deforestation and degradation of forests. A group of fifteen countries called the "Rainforest
Coalition Alliance" represents the interests of the deforesting developing countries. This
group makes propositions on how to finance this mechanism, and how to estimate and
control for deforestation reductions.
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otherwise.
The main result of the paper is that the steady state welfare of the recip-
ient economy first increases with the REDD transfer and then decreases. By
assumption, the REDD transfer is a linear function of the remaining stock
of forest and of the deforestation rate. The model shows that the higher the
transfer, the lower the stock of agricultural land under cultivation at steady
state, but also the higher the amount of capital per unit of land. Combin-
ing these two effects implies that the steady state agricultural output first
increases with the transfer and then decreases. The possibility of increasing
the output while less land is under cultivation arises because of the exces-
sive deforestation context. Farmers are lured into deforesting by a short
term effect that makes newly cleared land more productive even though this
short-term fertility boost disappears quickly. However, there is a feedback
effect of deforestation that reduces agricultural production in the long run.
In fact, a decrease in the stock of the nearby forest leads to ecosystem dis-
turbances and erosion that reduce agricultural yields (Ehui & Hertel, 1989).
In this context, relatively low REDD transfer schemes induce efficiency gains
by adjusting the capital over land ratio in agriculture at steady state. For
high transfer schemes, however, the capital over land ratio becomes too high,
which leads to a decrease in agricultural output. The steady state welfare
depends on the REDD transfer scheme because of both the impact of the
transfer on agricultural output and the external revenue it provides. Thus
the steady state welfare may decrease for high transfer schemes. This possi-
bility arises even though high transfer schemes raise external revenue as long
as this extra revenue does not offset the decrease in agricultural output. The
other sector, manufacturing, only requires capital as input, hence its steady
state output is unaffected by the REDD transfer.
The model first takes the perspective of a social planner who perfectly
controls for land conversion and for its long term feedback effect, while ne-
glecting the greenhouse gas emissions that result from deforestation because
its objective is to maximize national welfare. This simplifying assumption
departs from the recent literature that focuses on institutional failures, con-
flicts, and corruption (Barbier et al., 2005; Hotte, 2005; Amacher et al., 2008)
to explain the link between deforestation and slow growth patterns.
In the decentralized equilibrium, the model predicts that the REDD
mechanism reduces deforestation less efficiently than in the social optimum.
The last section of the paper solves the symmetric open-loop Nash equi-
librium in a dynamic deforestation game. The REDD transfer is evenly
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redistributed among producers but it depends on the aggregate levels of de-
forestation and forest stock. Each agricultural producer recognizes that her
clearing behavior affects the aggregate levels of deforestation and forest stock.
However, each producer neglects the externality that her clearing behavior
has on the productivity of other producers’ land, as well as on the REDD
transfer.
Many economists have emphasized that a transfer conditional on forest
preservation needs to provide the right incentives to developing countries to
be environmentally efficient. For instance, Stähler (1996) analyzed the per-
verse incentives given by a variable rate of transfer that leads to a higher
level of deforestation, which in turn raises the amount of transfer (due to a
scarcity effect); van Soest & Lensink (2000) advocated the need for a com-
bined mechanism that offers a transfer which increases with the stock of
forest and decreases with the deforestation level (using stick-and-carrot tac-
tics). However, focusing on forest stock dynamics, these studies neglect the
analysis of broader economic impacts that emerge from input substitution
and capital investments. The findings of this paper also relate to the broader
literature on aid effectiveness. From the work by Burnside & Dollar (2000), a
large body of empirical literature argues that foreign aid may have detrimen-
tal impacts on growth due to inefficient domestic policy, and that conditional
aid has more positive impacts when it encourages policies that foster capital
investments.2
2. Background: The REDD mechanism
An official agreement has recently been achieved on reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD or REDD+) during the
UNFCCC conference of the Parties in Cancun, in December 2010.3 To be
2 Recently, Rajan & Subramanian (2008); Easterly (2006); Djankov et al. (2008) demon-
strate that aid can have detrimental long-term effects on growth, through an institutional
channel (weakening institutions and favoring corruption) and through a macroeconomic
channel on competitiveness (Dutch disease).
3The debate emerged at the conference of the Parties in Bali (2007) and continued at the
Copenhagen conference (December, 2009). See www.un-redd.org. REDD includes activi-
ties aiming at reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation, whereas REDD+,
in addition to REDD, includes enhancing forest carbon stocks through activities such as
forest conservation, forest restoration and sustainable forest management (Angelsen et al.,
2009; Kanowski et al., 2011).
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part of the REDD mechanism, countries must undertake activities accord-
ing to a phased approach. In the first phase, called "readiness", countries
develop national strategies, assess national reference emission levels, and im-
plement a robust and transparent national forest monitoring system. In the
second phase, countries implement their national policies aiming at preserv-
ing tropical forests. In the third phase, countries can receive performance-
based incentive payments, that is, payments for verified emissions reductions.
Designing the performance-based incentive scheme is one of the important
challenges of the REDD mechanism, but it also offers better prospects for
achieving forest preservation than most previous forest policy interventions
(Pfaff et al., 2010).
Many drawbacks however limit the expected emission reductions: carbon
sequestration in forest is not permanent; there is a risk that deforestation
will move toward non participating countries, leading to carbon leakage; and
the governance issue is often problematic in tropical developing countries,
implying a high risk that the transfer will be diverted to corruption and
rent-seeking (Myers, 2007). An important debate rests on the controversial
issue on how to evaluate the reference level of deforestation, which can be
assessed through past trends in a business-as-usual scenario, political ne-
gotiations or econometric modeling (Myers, 2007; Ebeling & Yasué, 2008;
Combes Motel et al., 2009). A reliable source of financing is crucial for the
developing countries to decide whether or not they will participate (Eliasch,
2008; Isenberg & Potvin, 2010). Hence, the large debate on how to evaluate
the costs of REDD projects and on how to control and monitor the reduction
in deforestation may impede these projects being carrying out.
Because REDD projects are mostly in their infancy, result-based incen-
tive schemes have hardly been implemented, apart from the large bilateral
programs of Norway in Brazil, Indonesia, Guyana and Tanzania. As illus-
trated by the Amazon Fund, donations (USD 1 billion) are linked directly
to results, i.e. to emission trends.4 More precisely, payments in a particu-
lar year will depend on the difference between emissions from deforestation
in the previous year and a reference level, which is the average for the cur-
rent ten-year calculation period, and which is updated every five years. If
4See Norwegian initiative on http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Selected-
topics/climate/the-government-of-norways-international-/norway-
amazon-fund.html, and more details on the Amazon Fund on
http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/fam/site_en/
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emissions in a particular year are higher than the reference level, no pay-
ment will be made to the Amazon fund in the subsequent year. Hence, this
scheme rests on ex-post evaluation of the emissions due to deforestation, and
respects national sovereignty because the fund is managed by the Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES). The incentive scheme that performs well for
Brazil is however unlikely to suit Guyana, where deforestation hardly occurs
despite its large tropical forest. In this context, Norway has offered up to
USD 250 millions for preserving the stock of forest in Guyana. Both the
deforestation level and the stock of forest can be considered in the incentive
scheme, depending on the deforestation patterns of the recipient countries.
This paper is an attempt to assess the impacts of a prospective REDD
mechanism on the recipient economies, assuming their deforestation deci-
sions are optimal and abstracting from the risk of international leakage that
would relocate land clearing in the neighboring countries. In the absence of
consensus on the design of the REDD mechanism, this paper uses a stylized
version of Brazil and Guyana incentive schemes.
3. The analytical framework
Consider an economy composed of two sectors, agriculture and manufac-
turing. Each sector has a sector-specific fixed supply of labor and a supply
of capital that changes due to investment and depreciation. The agricultural
sector also uses land, whose supply depends on the deforestation process. The
focus of the paper is on the trade-off between capital accumulation and defor-
estation, hence the issues of technological change and of knowledge spillovers
that generate endogenous growth are neglected. I assume that the country
is a small open economy, so that all prices are given by the international
markets.
3.1. Agricultural expansion and production
The economy’s land endowment is normalized to one unit. Since the
economy is initially endowed with a large amount of forested land, the forest
stock constitutes a land resource, which is subject to an irreversible conver-
sion by an economic activity, agriculture. Hence, denoting by Ft ≥ 0 the
amount of land left in native forests, Lt = 1−Ft represents agricultural land.
Initially, the economy has a relatively low endowment L0 of agricultural land.
Denoting by dt the amount of resource conversion, and using x˙ ≡ dx/dt for
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any variable x, land use changes over time are determined by
L˙t = dt. (1)
Assuming that deforestation in the tropics is an irreversible process implies
that no reforestation occurs on cleared land. Otherwise, the carbon release
due to deforestation would be partially compensated for by the regrowth
process.5
Land conversion increases agricultural production, but this effect varies
through time. This paper describes two impacts of deforesting on production.
The first impact arises from a short-term incentive to deforest because newly
cleared land has higher productivity. Empirical evidence in tropical countries
show that the clearing and the burning of biomass that usually accompany
land conversion release all nutrients at once.6 After a few years, the newly
converted land loses its extra nutrients and productivity falls. The second
impact is a long-term stock feedback effect: a reduced forest cover decreases
the aggregate productivity of agricultural land. There is also evidence that
high deforestation induces a local externality on agricultural production due
to ecosystem disturbance. In fact, the tropical acid soils suffer from a fall
in protection from the near forest cover, which leads to erosion, and the dis-
turbed local conditions can lead to irregular rainfalls and to a decrease in
water supply. This combination of short-term and long-term effects of defor-
estation on agricultural yields appears in Ehui & Hertel (1989); Ehui et al.
(1990), and is also considered by van Soest & Lensink (2000); Barbier et al.
(2005). It reflects the trade-off between clearing new land and preserving
forest at the level of the representative producer.
The agricultural sector output, ya, is
yat = f(dt, Lt, Kat)(1− βLt), (2)
where f(.) is a twice differentiable and strictly concave function with respect
to newly cleared land dt, accumulated land Lt, and rural capital Kat, and
5This paper examines a mechanism aiming at reducing deforestation. I do not con-
sider afforestation and assume that deforestation is irreversible for two main reasons:
first, afforestation and forest management projects are already considered in the Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, whereas deforestation is not; second, ac-
counting for carbon sequestration in the trees requires more information on species and
on rotational management (age of the cohorts), as illustrated in Sohngen & Mendelsohn
(2003).
6See http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Deforestation/
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where 1− βL corresponds to the stock feedback effect of deforestation, with
0 < β < 1. The parameter β is used for performing comparative statics in
the rest of the paper. Once a large amount of forest has been cleared, the
local externality erodes the incentives to deforest. This feedback effect gives
a value to the standing forest, which may avoid its complete depletion. It is
an alternative to representing an amenity effect in the utility function. Even
the highest feedback effect does not lead to soil infertility or desertification
given that production remains positive even when Lt = 1, i.e., when all land
are converted to agriculture. To account for the difference in productivity
between newly cleared land and land that has been cleared in the past, I
assume that newly deforested land dt is more productive than the stock of
accumulated agricultural land Lt by a constant factor ν. After one period
of time, newly converted land loses its extra nutrients and falls into the
stock of agricultural land Lt. This parsimonious representation of land into
two classes, one being more productive than the other because it is newly
converted, can be compared to the vintage model for capital, where new
capital endowing new technology is therefore more productive. I specify f(.)
as a Cobb-Douglas function:
f(dt, Lt, Kat) = K
α
at(Lt + νdt)
1−α, (3)
where dt and Lt are perfect substitutes except that newly deforested land is
more productive by a constant factor ν > 0.7 The parameter ν transforms
a flow variable into a stock variable by having a time dimension. Both the
stocks of land and capital are necessary factors, whereas dt can reach zero
without hurting production.
The second sector only requires man-made capital, Knt, to produce man-
ufacturing goods. The production function of this sector is
ynt = AK
η
nt, η < 1, (4)
hence it is concave, increasing in the capital input, and satisfies the Inada
condition (as the input approaches zero its marginal product tends to infin-
ity). The productivity factor, A, is an exogenous constant parameter. The
model could be extended as in the endogenous growth literature by assuming
7If dt and Lt were imperfect substitutes in the Cobb-Douglas framework, then defor-
esting would be necessary for producing yat.
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that the productivity parameter is endogenous and evolves over time accord-
ing to a learning by doing mechanism (Matsuyama, 1992; Torvik, 2001).
These learning spillovers however would introduce another source of growth,
whereas the focus is on comparing land and capital accumulation dynamics.
Capital is the only intersectorally mobile factor, whereas land is a specific
factor to agricultural production. The total stock of capital is Kt = Kat+Knt,
which accumulates depending on the following investment decision:
K˙t = It − δKt, (5)
where It is the amount invested in physical capital at period t, evaluated in
terms of the agricultural good, which is the numeraire, and δ is the depreci-
ation rate of capital.
A complete model of development with deforestation would have labor
migration as a central component, and would consider labor allocation be-
tween the two sectors. Here, I implicitly assume that labor is immobile across
sectors and that its supply is fixed in each sector. Rural workers can only
clear and cultivate agricultural land whereas urban workers can only produce
manufacturing goods. This assumption can be justified by the lack of secured
property rights over land (Mendelsohn, 1994; Angelsen, 1999; Hotte, 2001).
Urban workers do not migrate because returns are lower in the agricultural
sector (due to insecure property rights), whereas rural workers do not mi-
grate because they have a security incentive to stay at home and protect
their tenure rights.8
3.2. The REDD mechanism
The developing country’s government internalizes the local feedback ef-
fect of deforestation on production, while it neglects the global externality
that arises from greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, the international commu-
nity offers a transfer if the government agrees to reduce deforestation at the
national scale. This transfer, which is called the REDD mechanism, provides
monetary incentives either to preserve the forest stock or to decrease the
deforestation level compared to a reference level. A general form of transfer
is S(dt, Ft), with Sd < 0 and SF > 0. Assuming additive separability of the
8The idea that informal property rights may "tie" households to their property and
affect labor market decisions is studied in an urban context in Peru by Field (2007).
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transfer function, I use the following linear functional form
S(dt, Ft) =
￿
γFt +R[dbas − dt] if γFt +Rdbas ≥ Rdt
0 otherwise,
(6)
where γ is the rate of transfer per unit of preserved forested land, and R
is the price of carbon sequestrated in one hectare of tropical forest (using
mean value for biomass yields), and both are assumed to be positive and
constant. The first part of the transfer function corresponds to a traditional
preservation scheme, where the stock of the resource matters. The second
part reflects the current debate on "avoided deforestation": the transfer is
proportional to a decrease in deforestation compared to an exogenous baseline
level dbas, i.e., proportional to a decrease in carbon emissions.
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If the international institution offers a transfer, S(dt, Ft) ≥ 0, the result-
ing mechanism is a foreign aid conditional on the environment. Due to its
conditionality, the mechanism influences the use and the accumulation deci-
sion of one factor (land). The mechanism however also provides a transfer
in terms of the agricultural good (numeraire), hence it eases the revenue
constraint of consumers and can facilitate investments. The welfare of the
developing country must be improved while participating to the mechanism.
Political reluctance to join the REDD mechanism for sovereignty reasons are
abstracted from.
3.3. The social planner’s problem
While opening to trade, the small economy expands its agricultural land
given the low initial endowment L0 relative to world prices. In a centrally
planned economy, the government’s problem is to maximize the intertemporal
utility of the representative agent.10
Let xa denote consumption of the agricultural good and xn consumption
of manufacturing goods. Preferences of the representative consumer are given
by
U(xa, xn) =
￿
￿− 1
[xφax
1−φ
n ]
￿−1
￿ , (7)
9The controversial issue on how to evaluate dbas is not addressed here: I assume that
dbas results from international negotiations. For simplicity reason, I assume that dbas is
constant. Assuming that dbas was decreasing through time would reduce the magnitude
of the impacts.
10I assume that the population size is constant over time. Extension of the model to
positive population growth is straightforward. All variables are defined per capita.
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where ￿ > 0 is a fixed parameter representing the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution, and 0 < φ < 1. Assuming an elasticity of substitution of
one between the two goods implies that the shares of revenue devoted to
consumption of each good are constant. It simplifies the analysis because
the value of consumption of xn is proportional to that of xa.
The social planner chooses the consumption and the deforestation pat-
terns that maximize
W =
￿
∞
0
U(xat, xnt)e
−ρtdt, (8)
where ρ denotes the social rate of time preference, subject to (1) and (5),
given L(0) = L0 and K(0) = K0, with xat ≥ 0, xnt ≥ 0, dt ≥ 0, and
Lt = 1− Ft, and subject to the budget constraint:
yat + pynt + S(dt, Ft) ≥ xat + pxnt + It, (9)
where p is the relative price of manufacturing goods in terms of the numeraire,
the agricultural good. The society’s total income, coming from production
and transfer, must equal or be greater than consumption and investment
expenditures (Dixit & Norman, 1980). If the budget constraint holds with
equality (which occurs given the maximization assumption), it necessarily
implies balanced trade. The (present-value) Hamiltonian of this problem is
Ht = U(xat, xnt)e
−ρt + λt [yat + pynt + S(dt, Ft)− xat − pxnt − It]
+µt[It − δKt] + χt[Kt −Kat −Knt]− ψtdt, (10)
where µt and ψt denote the co-state variables associated with capital accu-
mulation (5) and with land conversion (1), respectively. λt and χt are the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget constraint and with the
constraint on the stock of capital. Ht is defined under the assumption that
the agricultural land endowment is within its natural bound, Lt ∈ [0, 1].
Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle and assuming an interior so-
lution result in necessary conditions for the optimal allocation of assets in
the economy. The first-order conditions with respect to the two consumption
goods are
φ(xnt/xat)
1−φ[xφatx
1−φ
nt ]
−1/￿e−ρt = λt (11)
(1− φ)(xat/xnt)
φ[xφatx
1−φ
nt ]
−1/￿e−ρt = pλt. (12)
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Using (11) and (12), it follows that at the optimum xa and xn are consumed in
fixed proportion for a given level of p. Hence, I can represent the consumption
optimality conditions in terms of the marginal utility of xa only:
λt =
￿
1− φ
φp
￿(1−φ)(￿−1)/￿
x
−1/￿
at e
−ρt. (13)
Condition (13) equalizes the constant-value marginal utility of consumption
with the shadow value of income. Because xa and xn are proportional for a
given p, the rate of growth of the consumer’s utility is entirely determined
by the rate of growth of xa. The first-order conditions that allocate capital
across sectors are
χt = λt
∂yat
∂Ka
= λtp
∂ynt
∂Kn
. (14)
Hence, the marginal returns from capital in agriculture and in the manufac-
turing sector must be equal.
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions with respect to investment and
land accumulation are:
− λt + µt ≤ 0, It[−λt + µt] = 0, It ≥ 0, (15)
λt
￿
∂yat
∂d
+ Sd
￿
− ψt ≤ 0, d
￿
λt
∂yat
∂d
+ λtSd − ψt
￿
= 0, d ≥ 0. (16)
A positive investment in capital implies that the shadow value of the stock
of capital is equal to the shadow value of income. Similarly, (16) indicates
that the shadow value of additional land conversion, ψt, equals the net ben-
efit from deforesting an additional hectare. It reflects the intertemporal
nonarbitrage condition according to which postponing deforestation from
one period to another creates no profit. I assume throughout that the non-
negativity constraint on d holds. Deforestation occurs as long as ψt > 0, that
is ∂yat/∂d > −Sd, to ensure a positive net benefit from deforesting.
The co-state variable dynamics for the assets are
µ˙t = −χt + µtδ (17)
ψ˙t = λt
￿
∂yat
∂L
+ SL
￿
. (18)
As in Hartwick et al. (2001), the formulation of the model implies a specific
meaning for ψt, because total land area is held constant at unity, hence a small
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decrease in forest is necessarily obtained through an increase in agricultural
land. It follows that ψ(0) measures the initial relative desirability of forested
land compared to agricultural land. During the deforestation path, one can
expect that the relative desirability of forested land will increase. When a
large amount of forest has been cleared, however, a high feedback effect can
lead to a negative net marginal productivity of the stock of agricultural land.
Finally the transversality conditions for this model are given by
lim
t→∞
µtKt = 0, lim
t→∞
ψt[1− Lt] = 0.
Given that (15) implies λt = µt when investment is positive, and given
(14), differentiating (13) with respect to time and equalizing it to (17) leads
to
x˙at/xat = ￿
￿
∂yat
∂Ka
− (ρ+ δ)
￿
. (19)
If the marginal returns from capital are higher than the sum of the discount
rate and the depreciation rate, then any inter-temporal elasticity of substitu-
tion ￿ > 0 is consistent with a growing consumption path (note that the pro-
portionality in consumption of the two final goods implies x˙at/xat = x˙nt/xnt).
When land conversion occurs (dt > 0), using (16), (18) and (19), as well
as the additively separable linear transfer scheme that implies SdF = Sdd = 0,
gives
d˙t = −
dt
ν
− Lt+νdt
ν
￿
∂yat
∂Ka
− δ − K˙at
Kat
+ 1
αν
￿
1− β(Lt+ανdt)
(1−α)(1−βLt)
￿￿
−
γ+R(
∂yat
∂Ka
−δ)
∂2yat/∂d2
.(20)
Given that the first two terms of the last expression are negative if K˙at <
αyat − δKat, the deforestation level is likely to be decreasing through time.
The third term being positive, it would imply that the transfer influences the
patterns of deforestation (through γ and R) by reducing the change in the
deforestation level, that is, by smoothing the process of clearing land through
time. Notice that if the social discount rate tends toward zero and as the
marginal productivity of capital in agriculture converges toward the depreci-
ation rate, the impact of the marginal transfer for avoiding deforestation, R,
decreases whereas the impact of the marginal transfer for forest preservation,
γ, remains the same.
Below I focus on the steady state of a diversified economy. Because the
only mobile factor is capital, whose endowment is not fixed, the small open
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economy is diversified. In fact, the agricultural sector always produces a
positive amount of output due to the absence of land use cost. Similarly,
the assumption of decreasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector
(implying that there is an implicit factor, labor, which is normalized to one)
implies positive profit, and thus this sector also produces a positive amount
of output.
3.4. Steady state analysis
At steady state, x˙a = L˙ = d˙ = K˙ = 0. Denote by xa∞, Ka∞, Kn∞
and L∞ the long run levels of food consumption, rural capital, urban capital
and agricultural land, respectively. As proved in the appendix A, the steady
state is a (local) saddle point. A negative exogenous shock in capital, far
from increasing the pressure on forest, reduces the incentive to deforest and
the economy tends toward the same steady state.
Using (17), (19) and (20), the steady state diversified economy is charac-
terized by the following conditions:
∂ya
∂Ka
= p
∂yn
∂Kn
= ρ+ δ (21)
∂ya
∂L
+ ρ
∂ya
∂d
= SF − ρSd. (22)
Hence, the marginal returns from capital equal the discount rate plus the
depreciation rate of capital. Equation (21) thus determines the steady state
level of urban capital. Dividing both sides of (22) by ρ implies that the
sum of the immediate and discounted future agricultural gains from an ad-
ditional acre of cleared land equals the immediate and discounted future
transfer losses due to this additional deforestation. Notice that SF − ρSd is
a constant denoted by s ≡ γ + ρR ≥ 0 given (6). The parameters γ and R
affect separately the transition path, but the steady state depends on these
parameters only under the combination s. Therefore the parameter s has an
important role in the analysis of the REDD impacts on the steady state of
the recipient economy. Combining (21) and (22) gives the following implicit
equation for the steady state level of agricultural land,￿
α(1− βL)
ρ+ δ
￿ α
1−α
[ξ − βL (1 + ξ)] = s, (23)
where ξ ≡ (1−α)(1+ρν). By definition, L ≥ L0. Denote by s¯ the minimum
incentive transfer for which the recipient country decides to protect its entire
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stock of forest. Using (23) gives
s¯ ≡ [ξ − βL0(1 + ξ)]
￿
α(1− βL0)
ρ+ δ
￿ α
1−α
. (24)
Hence,
Lemma 1. The steady state level of agricultural land, L∞, is an interior
solution (L∞ ∈ [L0, 1]) determined by (23) for s ∈ [0, s¯] if L0, β, α and ξ
satisfy L0 < ξ/[β(1 + ξ)] and
ξ
1 + ξ
< β <
1− α + ξ
1 + ξ
. (H1)
Proof: cf. the appendix.
Lemma 1 sets restrictions on parameter values so that the steady state
level of agricultural land lies between the initial level of agricultural land L0
and the entire land endowment. In particular, the initial level of agricultural
land needs to be relatively low. H1 compares the feedback effect of defor-
estation β that reduces production with the short-term productivity boost
coming from newly deforested land. By definition, ξ/(1 + ξ) is increasing
in the discounted fertility boost, ρν, and in the output elasticity of land,
(1 − α). The first inequality in H1 imposes a high feedback effect β when
the productivity surplus ν and the discount rate ρ are high, and when the
output elasticity of capital α is low. Hence, when the benefits from defor-
esting are high or when the social planner is impatient, forest preservation
takes place if the productivity loss from a disturbed ecosystem is high. β is
the only factor that represents a damage from deforesting to the developing
country. The feedback effect, however, needs to be bounded above, otherwise
the productivity loss would cancel the incentive to deforest.
Consider the case where s = 0 (which implies γ = 0 and R = 0 due to
the additive separability of the transfer function). The developing economy
thus receives no external revenue and grows by accumulating land and capital
without any constraint on its deforestation path. Given (23), the laissez-faire
economy would convert the following amount of land at steady state
L∞ =
ξ
β(1 + ξ)
< 1, (25)
which is decreasing in β but increasing in ρν. It may be surprising that a short
term productivity effect has an impact on the steady state. Because all newly
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deforested land features the same productivity surplus, ν affects the long run.
This discounted fertility boost induces farmers to deforest more than what
would be optimal at steady state. The marginal productivity of accumulated
land is negative at steady state: ∂ya/∂L|L=L∞ = −
ρν
1+ξ
￿
α
(1+ξ)(ρ+δ)
￿
, which
tends toward zero when ρν → 0. Because farmers deforest too much, a
strong feedback effect of deforestation on production induces the marginal
productivity of land to be negative. The social planner however made a trade-
off between the short-term benefits from deforesting (higher productivity)
and the long-term feedback effect that was optimal at each period. Observe
that if ρ→ 0, an infinitely patient social planner would deforest such that the
marginal productivity of land would be nonnegative at steady state. In the
context of excessive deforestation in the long run, the REDD mechanism can
have a positive impact on the economy by reducing the incentive to deforest
at each period.
4. The impacts of the REDD mechanism
In the following, I compare the steady states associated with different lev-
els of international transfer (assumed to be constant over time). Comparing
steady state welfares is not equivalent to comparing discounted welfares. The
impacts of the REDD mechanism on the transition path are not considered.
Focusing on steady state welfares, however, makes it possible to compare an
environmental achievement (stock of forest) with an economic achievement
(domestic production versus external revenue). Denote by X∞(s) the steady
state level of variable X in the economy where the REDD payment scheme
s has been introduced.
To find how the REDD payment scheme influences the steady-state econ-
omy, I first assess its impacts on the steady state level of agricultural land.
For s ≥ s¯ where s¯ is defined by (24), the level of agricultural land would re-
main at its initial value, hence L∞(s¯) = L0. The recipient economy becomes
a "forest heaven" and bans deforestation from its territory. In the "forest
heaven" economy, growth is limited because only capital can be accumulated,
and the steady state level of rural capital is proportional to the small initial
level of land. Given that the REDD payment scheme varies on the interval
[0, s¯], using (23) and lemma 1 gives
Lemma 2. The introduction of the REDD mechanism reduces the steady
state level of agricultural land, which is a decreasing and convex function of
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the transfer scheme, s.
Proof: cf. the appendix.
In the long run, the REDD mechanism is environmentally efficient be-
cause it reduces deforestation: L∞(s) ≤ L∞, but the marginal impact of the
transfer scheme is decreasing. As illustrated in figure 1, the convexity of
L∞(s) with respect to s validates the optimistic view according to which low
rates of transfer suffice to reduce sharply deforestation due to low opportu-
nity cost projects (Stern, 2007). The marginal cost of preserving one acre of
tropical forest increases while the stock of preserved forest increases.
✻
✲ s
0
L0
L∞(s)
L∞
s¯
Figure 1: Environmental effect of the REDD mechanism: the higher the transfer scheme
s the lower the steady state level of agricultural land L∞(s).
The impacts of the REDD mechanism on the recipient economy depend
on how stringent the environmental constraint is. A higher transfer scheme
leads to more external revenue at each period, which has long lasting effects
because it facilitates investments. The impacts on the two sectors differ in
the long run:
Proposition 1. The REDD mechanism has a technical effect on the rural
sector: a higher transfer scheme leads to further agricultural intensification.
By contrast, the steady state stock of urban capital is independent of the
REDD mechanism.
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Proof: cf. the appendix.
Any increase in the REDD payment scheme substitutes more man-made
capital for land in the agricultural sector. This technical effect relies upon
the assumption of imperfect factor substitution in the production of good
ya (Cobb-Douglas functional form). While agricultural land becomes scarcer
when s increases, the representative producer compensates for the "miss-
ing land" by intensifying its production. This assumption of imperfect sub-
stitution is realistic in the context of agriculture because any agricultural
production would require some land.
Proposition 1 also states that the stock of capital in the manufacturing
sector is independent of s in the long run.11 The external revenue coming
from the transfer may serve to speed the transition toward the steady state
without expanding the long run manufacturing sector. This result rests on
the assumption that the manufacturing sector only requires one factor, cap-
ital, i.e., there is no migration of labor between the urban and rural sectors.
If the relative price p is given by international markets, then Kn∞ is fixed in
the long run by the golden rule that equates investment with depreciation.
Denote by sA and sC the rates of transfer that maximize the steady state
levels of agricultural output and consumption, respectively. As shown in the
appendix,
Proposition 2. The economic impacts of the REDD mechanism are
i/ For s < sA, the steady state levels of agricultural product and rural
capital stock are increasing in s, whereas they are decreasing in s for
s > sA;
ii/ Net total income and consumption steady state levels are also concave
in s if the change in s is mostly driven by a change in R, and thus find
a maximum for the transfer scheme sC such that sA < sC ≤ s¯.
11If the manufacturing goods were non traded, the relative price pt would reflect the real
exchange rate of the economy and would vary through time. Given the functional form of
the utility function (7), the budget shares for consuming both goods remain proportional.
Hence, if a high REDD scheme increases (reduces) the relative price of the non-traded
good, the steady state stock of urban capital would decrease (increase). As in the Dutch
disease literature (Corden & Neary, 1982), a real appreciation would lead to a decline in
the long term urban sector.
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Proof: cf. the appendix.
Point i/ states that for relatively low transfer schemes, the conditional
transfer induces both a decrease in the steady state level of agricultural land
and a rise in the agricultural product. The agricultural sector benefits from
the transfer because it reduces its land intensity in a context where the
marginal productivity of land is negative at steady state. This is illustrated
by (22), which can be rewritten as ∂ya/∂L = s− ρ∂ya/∂d, which is negative
for low levels of transfer scheme. The social planner trading off the short term
benefits and the long term feedback effect of deforestation notwithstanding, it
is the short-term fertility boost from newly cleared land that induces farmers
to deforest too much compared to the long-run productivity of the land.
By reducing the incentive to deforest at each period, the REDD mechanism
improves the long term efficiency of the agricultural sector. The steady state
level of rural capital increases with s when s < sA. For high transfer schemes,
however, the environmental constraint implies that the agricultural sector
shrinks. The rural sector faces the limits of factor substitution. Despite the
technical effect shown above, decreasing marginal returns imply that a higher
steady state level of rural capital is not sufficient to maintain production.
The price distortion introduced by the REDD mechanism raises the ratio of
capital over land too much, which leads to efficiency losses.
Point ii/ illustrates the impacts of the REDD mechanism on the steady
state welfare. The economy relies on three sources of income: the manufac-
turing output, the agricultural output and the international transfer. The
manufacturing output is independent of the transfer scheme at steady state.
The two other sources of income, which form the agriculture-related income,
depend on the transfer either directly or indirectly through the amounts
of agricultural land and rural capital. The steady state welfare that only
depends on consumption levels is thus a function of the agriculture-related
income. Given the definition of s as γ + ρR, the agriculture-related income
at steady state is
Wa∞(s) ≡ ya∞(s)− δKa∞(s) + γ[1− L∞(s)] + (s− γ)dbas/ρ. (26)
While the external revenue from the transfer is increasing in s, the net revenue
from the agricultural sector is increasing in s when s ≤ sA and decreasing in
s when s > sA. This result leads to the non-monotonicity of the steady state
welfare in s if the agriculture-related income is concave and finds a maximum
for sC ∈ [sA, s¯]. This possibility arises when the change in s is mostly driven
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by a change in the compensation offered for a reduction in the deforestation
rate, R. In this context, the impact of a variation in s on the agricultural
output outweighs its impact on the transfer. Hence, high transfer schemes
decrease the steady state welfare. Otherwise, the steady state welfare finds
a maximum for sC = s¯. Figure 2 illustrates the case where the steady state
welfare decreases with s for high transfer schemes.
✲
✻
0 sA s¯ ssC
ya∞ − δaKa∞
S∞
Wa∞, S∞
ya∞ − δaKa∞
Wa∞
Figure 2: Impacts of the REDD mechanism on the agriculture-related income, i.e., on
agricultural returns and on the conditional transfer.
Reinterpreting the model as a Ricardo-Viner model where agriculture
uses land as a specific factor while manufacturing uses a hidden fixed factor,
labor, offers another explanation for the steady state stock of urban capital
being unaffected by the REDD mechanism while the stocks of rural capital
and land vary. Because capital is the only mobile factor, the relative size of
the two industries depends on the capital market clearing condition. Figure 3
illustrates the equilibrium where the marginal returns from capital are equal
across sectors and more precisely equal to ρ + δ at steady state. Simplified
notations py￿n and y
￿
a|K¯,L¯ reflect the fact that only the marginal returns from
rural capital depend on the aggregate stocks of land and capital. Suppose the
transfer scheme s increases. Lemma 2 states that the stock of agricultural
land decreases, which affects the marginal returns from rural capital. For
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a low transfer scheme s < sA, the decrease in agricultural land from L¯ to
L¯￿ raises the marginal productivity of capital in agriculture (cf. proposition
2). This possibility arises because of the context of excessive deforestation.
Figure 3a) illustrates the inner shift of the marginal returns from rural capital
from y￿a|K¯,L¯ (bold curve) to y
￿
a|K¯,L¯￿ . Holding the capital stock constant, the
REDD mechanism would reduce the amount of capital used by manufacturing
and increase the marginal returns from capital. However, the steady state
condition (21) requires that the marginal returns from capital equal ρ + δ.
Hence, increasing the aggregate stock of capital from K¯ to K¯ ￿ will reduce
the marginal returns from capital by shifting the curve y￿a|K¯,L¯￿ to the right
toward y￿a|K¯￿,L¯￿ . At steady state, the amount of urban capital is unchanged
whereas agriculture has absorbed any additional stock of capital. Figure 3b)
illustrates the case with high transfer schemes (s > sA) where an increase in
s decreases the marginal productivity of rural capital, which would reduce
the marginal returns from capital except for the capital stock reduction.
The long term impacts of the REDD mechanism on the recipient economy
are positive for low transfer schemes because it reduces excessive deforesta-
tion. With high transfer schemes, however, it is optimal for the social planner
to choose a deforestation path at which the steady state welfare is smaller
than with lower transfer schemes.
5. Decentralized solution using the open-loop equilibrium in a dy-
namic deforestation game
Whereas the REDD impacts in the social planner’s case rely on perfect
monitoring of deforestation, redistributing REDD transfers to farmers might
lead to different outcomes. In the decentralized equilibrium, the represen-
tative household consumes and invests in capital while she receives revenue
from lending her capital to producers who are producing either agricultural
or manufacturing goods. All economic agents are infinitely-lived, and the
household’s preferences are given by (7).
First, consider the representative household’s decisions. Denote by r the
rate of returns from capital. The problem of the representative household is
to maximize the discounted flow of utility from consumption, subject to the
revenue constraint: It = rtKt − xat − pxnt, given (5) and K(0) = K0. The
household determines the optimal levels of consumption and investment in
capital, given that capital depreciates at rate δ, and that she receives a unit
payment rt for lending her capital. The solution must respect conditions that
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a) For s < sA
✲
✻
py￿n
K
Marginal
returns
from
capital
Kn K¯ K¯ ￿
y￿a|K¯,L¯
y￿a|K¯,L¯￿
y￿a|K¯￿,L¯￿
ρ+ δ
b) For s > sA
✲
✻
py￿n
K
Marginal
returns
from
capital
Kn K¯ ￿ K¯
y￿a|K¯,L¯
y￿a|K¯￿,L¯￿
y￿a|K¯,L¯￿
ρ+ δ
Figure 3: Marginal returns from capital in both sectors and variation in the stocks of land
and capital.
are similar to (13), (15), and (17), except that rt substitutes for the marginal
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returns from capital. It can be easily shown that solving the representative
household’s program leads to the following condition:
rt − δ = ρ+
1
￿
x˙at
xat
. (27)
Second, the representative urban producer maximizes her profit under
perfect competition by choosing the level of capital use, which gives the
condition: rt = p∂ynt/∂Kn at each period. Combining this condition with
(27) implies that the trade-off between consumption and investment while
only taking into account the manufacturing sector is similar to the social
planner’s trade-off.
Third, each agricultural producer determines both the level of rural cap-
ital and the amount of land to use, hence the decision to deforest lies in her
hands. Assume that, once an acre has been deforested, the farmer is the
owner of the land. There is evidence that land clearing often gives the settler
tenure rights (Angelsen, 1999). The REDD transfer (6) is redistributed to
farmers to influence their decision to deforest. Because it depends on the
aggregate levels of deforestation, the mechanism is effective only if farmers
recognize that their clearing behaviors affect aggregate levels. If farmers be-
lieved that aggregate deforestation levels were fixed, they would view the
transfer as a lump sum transfer, and the mechanism would not impact their
decisions about deforesting. Deforestation is thus similar to a nonpoint source
pollution problem (Karp, 2005).
Assume a finite number of rural producers, n. Each farmer considers her
clearing behavior to have a small impact on the stock of forest, taking as
given the other farmers’ stock of land and deforestation level. Each of the n
farmers’ individual deforestation level is di while her stock of land is ￿i. As-
suming that the regulator has imperfect information on the individual levels
of deforestation, it simply redistributes an even share (1/n) of the transfer to
each farmer. I thus solve the open-loop Nash equilibrium to determine the
deforestation patterns. In this setting, the open-loop equilibrium is time con-
sistent, but it is not subgame perfect. Given the complexities of the model,
using the open-loop equilibrium makes it possible to raise some interesting
points in a simple setting.
The representative farmer increases her stock of agricultural land ￿it by
clearing new land according to
￿˙it = dit. (28)
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Her production function is yai = f(di, ￿i, kai)(1 − βL), where f(di, ￿i, kai) =
kαai(￿i + νdi)
1−α and kai is the individual use of rural capital, and where
(1−βL) represents the feedback effect of aggregate deforestation on produc-
tion. Each farmer chooses a trajectory {dit, kait}
∞
0 to maximize the present
discounted value of profits that include the redistributed transfer, that is,￿
∞
0
[f(dit, ￿it, kait)(1− βL)− rtkait + S(dt, Lt)/n] e
−
￿ t
0
rsdsdt, subject to (28),
dt = dit + (n − 1)djt, Lt = ￿it + (n − 1)￿jt, and Kat = kait + (n − 1)kajt
with j ￿= i, and dit ≥ 0. In an open-loop equilibrium, each farmer takes as
given the input accumulation trajectory of the other farmers {djt, ￿jt, kajt}
∞
0 .
Capital allocates optimally to rural production at each period according to
rt = ∂yai/∂kai. (29)
Hence, the representative household lends her capital to both sectors if the
marginal returns from capital are equal across sectors. Denoting by ψit the
co-state variable associated with land conversion, the necessary conditions
for a symmetric open-loop interior Nash equilibrium are
ψit = [∂yai/∂di −R/n]e
−
￿ t
0
rsds, (30)
ψ˙it =
￿
∂f(.)
∂￿i
(1− βL)− βf(.)− γ/n
￿
e−
￿ t
0
rsds, (31)
and the transversality condition is limt→∞ ψit[1− ￿it− (n−1)￿jt] = 0. Equal-
izing the time derivative of (30) with (31) determines the steady state indi-
vidual stock of land as a function of the aggregate stock of land
∂f(.)
∂￿i
(1− βL)− βf(.)− r
∂f(.)
∂di
(1− βL) =
γ + rR
n
, (32)
which differs from (22) in three ways: first, r replaces the social planner’s
discount rate ρ; second, the representative farmer only takes into account the
feedback effect from her decision to deforest on her production, neglecting
the externality on other producers; and third, the marginal transfer loss from
deforesting is divided by the number of farmers n.
At the symmetric open-loop equilibrium, all farmers adopt the same tra-
jectory, hence Lt = n￿it for all t. Combining (29) and (32) implies￿
α(1− βL)
r
￿ α
1−α
￿
ξa − βL
￿
1
n
+ ξa
￿￿
=
γ + rR
n
, (33)
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where ξa ≡ (1 + νr)(1 − α). Using (27) implies that r = ρ + δ > ρ at
steady state. Therefore, ξa > ξ. In the absence of transfer (γ = 0, R = 0),
farmers will deforest until the following aggregate level of agricultural land
is L˜∞ = ξa/[β(1/n+ ξa)] at steady state. Because the steady state aggregate
stock of agricultural land is increasing in ξa, even if there was only one farmer
(n = 1) more deforestation would occur in the decentralized equilibrium than
in the social optimum in the laissez-faire economy. As the number of farmers
increases, the aggregate level of agricultural land increases. No forest remains
at steady state if n ≥ β/[ξa(1− β)].
For a given positive transfer scheme (γ ≥ 0, R ≥ 0), the environmental
impacts of the REDD mechanism in the decentralized equilibrium differ from
the impacts in the social optimum. First, farmers’ decision to deforest de-
pends on different opportunity costs, which are represented by the right hand
side of (33) and of (23). Because the discount rate differs and because the
transfer is divided among n producers in the decentralized equilibrium, the
opportunity cost of deforesting (γ+rR)/n is lower than s = γ+ρR if and only
if (n− 1)s > Rδ, which holds for n > 1 and δ < (n− 1)ρ. The transfer being
redistributed evenly across farmers, a common property problem diminishes
its impact on the aggregate level of deforestation when the number of farm-
ers is large. The REDD mechanism hardly reduces deforestation when the
number of farmers tends toward infinity. If however the number of farmers is
limited, the higher discount rate of the representative producer may mitigate
this effect by magnifying the rate of transfer for avoiding deforestation, R.
Second, the monetary incentive to achieve the same reduction in aggregate
deforestation is higher in the decentralized equilibrium compared to the so-
cial optimum. This result compares the left hand side of (33) and of (23),
and the details are in the appendix. The following proposition summarizes
the results for the environmental impact:
Proposition 3. In the open-loop symmetric equilibrium where farmers re-
ceive an even share of the REDD transfer, the transfer scheme (γ, R) reduces
deforestation less efficiently than in the social optimum.
Proof: see the appendix.
The environmental impact of the REDD mechanism in the decentralized
equilibrium is lower than in the social optimum, and this discrepancy widens
as the number of farmers increases. This result implies that the impacts of
the REDD mechanism on the steady state agriculture-related income in the
decentralized equilibrium are also lower, but qualitatively similar.
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The open-loop equilibrium assumes that farmers make binding decisions
about their future deforestation levels at the initial period. If any farmer
were to deviate from equilibrium, the remaining plan of future deforestation
of all farmers would no longer constitute an equilibrium. Hence, the open-
loop equilibrium is not subgame perfect. This shortcoming is well known.
By contrast, a Markov Perfect equilibrium, in which all farmers condition
their actions on the state variable (here, the stock of agricultural land), is
subgame perfect, but the equilibrium is not unique. Assuming that each
farmer’s decision to deforest depends negatively on the aggregate stock of
agricultural land, farmers’ deforestation levels become strategic substitutes.
If farmer i expects other farmers to reduce their deforestation levels when
the aggregate stock of land increases, she has an incentive to over-deforest.
The Markov Perfect equilibrium thus might lead to even less reduction in
deforestation than the open-loop equilibrium.
6. Concluding remarks
The REDD mechanism plays the role of a conditional aid for a forest-
abundant small open developing economy. This transfer has a non-monotonic
effect on the steady state welfare of the economy. The non-linear effect
of the conditional aid on the agricultural product at steady state reflects
a type of "Aid Laffer curve" (Lensink & White, 2001). Using a growth
model that allows for substitution between land and capital, I find that
the REDD mechanism has two impacts on the economy. First, it deters
deforestation and reduces the use of land in agriculture, which increases
agricultural productivity for relatively low transfer schemes and decreases it
for high transfer schemes. Second, it provides an external revenue that can
be used for consumption or for capital investments. When the increase in the
external revenue does not compensate for the decrease in agricultural output,
the REDD mechanism induces the social planner to choose a deforestation
path at which the steady state welfare is smaller than with lower transfer
schemes. In the literature on aid effectiveness, this detrimental impact often
passes through an institutional channel (by favoring corruption) or through
a diminishing-competitiveness channel. Here, in the absence of corrupted
behavior and using a two-sector growth model, it is only generated by a higher
opportunity cost of reducing deforestation. Should the REDD mechanism
considered in this paper become a formal international agreement, policy
makers should be aware that setting a transfer that is too high could result in
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lower long run welfare. This result however needs to be interpreted carefully
because it stems from a model with no possibility for growth in the long
run. Introducing technological progress, in particular if the rate of progress
depends on capital accumulation, may alter this result.
Given the absence of consensus on the design of an efficient incentive-
based transfer scheme that would reduce deforestation, the model illustrates
several important points. First, the incentive must be given at the national
level. We find that the REDD mechanism succeeds in raising the costs of
deforestation at the national level. However, implementing the mechanism
at the decentralized level requires strong monitoring and control from the
national government when individual farmers neglect the local externality of
deforesting on others’ production. Second, the opportunity cost of preserving
one acre of forest depends on the amount of land that remains forested in
the long run. Different transfer schemes lead to different forest stocks in the
long run. The benefits of land clearing are higher when the agricultural land
endowment is relatively small, given world prices. Third, agricultural land
is an asset that can be accumulated, and both capital and land endowments
can increase in a growing economy. This dynamic aspect must be considered
when evaluating the opportunity costs of REDD projects.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Local stability of the steady state
Since more cleared land would lead to another steady state, consider d = 0
and L fixed. Using (14) implies Kn = [(∂ya/∂Ka)/(pAη)]
1
η−1 and
K˙n =
1
p(η − 1)ηA
K2−ηn
∂2ya
∂K2a
K˙a.
By definition, K = Ka +Kn, hence K˙ = K˙a + K˙n. Given the expression of
Kn in terms of Ka, Ka can thus be expressed as a function of K. Using (5),
(9) and (19) gives the following dynamic equations:
K˙ = ya + pAK
η
n + S(1− L, 0)− xa/φ− δK
x˙a = ￿xa [∂ya/∂Ka − (ρ+ δ)] .
At the diversified steady state equilibrium,
δK = KαaL
1−α(1− βL) + pA [(δ + ρ)/(pAη)]
η
η−1 + γ(1− L) +Rdbas − xa/φ
δ + ρ = α [L/Ka]
1−α (1− βL).
Hence, using a first order Taylor development,￿
K˙
x˙a
￿
=
￿
χK χKx
χxK 0
￿ ￿
K −K∞
xa − xa∞
￿
,
where χKx = −1/φ < 0 and
χxK = −￿(1− α)(δ + ρ)(xa/Ka)
￿
1 +
(1− α)Kn
(1− η)Ka
￿
−1
< 0.
Hence, the Jacobian matrix is characterized by the determinant detJE =
−χxKχKx < 0. To establish that the steady state is locally a saddle point,
the two roots of the Jacobian matrix must have opposite signs, which always
holds because detJE < 0.
Consider an exogenous shock in capital, which reduces K∞ by Ψ. The
classical trade-off between consumption and investment implies a temporary
decrease in consumption, which should be sufficient to reinvest in capital
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and to compensate for the impact of the shock. However, the shock in cap-
ital may increase the pressure to deforest, which would modify instanta-
neously the steady state. Because the decrease in capital implies a decrease
in the marginal productivity of deforesting, using (16) gives at steady state
λ∞[∂ya∞/∂d + Sd] < ψ∞, which implies that ∂H/∂d < 0 and d = 0. Hence,
a shock in capital results in a land surplus compared to the capital level in
agriculture, which reduces the marginal productivity of deforesting. Thus
the economy tends toward the same steady state.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
(23) can be expressed as h(L)− s = 0, with
h(L) = [α(1− βL)/(ρ+ δ)]
α
1−α [ξ − βL (1 + ξ)] . (B.1)
We have
h￿(L) = − β
1−α
￿
α(1−βL)
ρ+δ
￿ α
1−α
￿
1 + ξ − α
1−βL
￿
,
whose sign depends on the last bracketed term, which is positive if and only if
L < (1−α+ξ)/[β(1+ξ)]. Since L ∈ [0, 1], a sufficient condition for h￿(L) < 0
is that β < 1−α/(1+ξ). Furthermore, (23) has a unique solution when s = 0
if h(0) and h(1) have opposite signs. We have h(0) = ξ[α/(ρ+ δ)]α/(1−α) > 0
and h(1) < 0 iff β > ξ/(1 + ξ). More precisely, we must have h(L0) > 0
which holds iff L0 < ξ/[β(1 + ξ)]. For s > 0, we have an interior solution iff
h(0) ≥ s, which imposes an upper bound on s. Using (24), this upper bound
corresponds to s¯. Hence, ξ/(1+ ξ) < β < 1−α/(1+ ξ) and L0 < ξ/[β(1+ ξ)]
are sufficient for finding a unique solution to (23) for s ∈ [0, s¯].
Appendix C. Proof of lemma 2
L∞(s) is a function satisfying L∞(0) = L∞ and L∞(s¯) = L0, which is
determined by h(L∞(s)) = s ≥ 0, using (B.1). Using the implicit function
theorem gives
L￿
∞
(s) = 1/h￿(L∞(s)). (C.1)
Given lemma 1, h(.) is a strictly decreasing function. Hence, L∞(s) is a
decreasing function of s, and finds a maximum in L∞. Using L
￿￿
∞
(s) =
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−h￿￿(L∞(s))[L
￿
∞
(s)]2/h￿(L∞(s)) and
h￿￿(L) = − βαh
￿(L)
(1−α)(1−βL)
+ β
2
(1−α)(1−βL)2
￿
α(1−βL)
ρ+δ
￿ α
1−α
> 0,
hence L∞(s) is a convex function of s.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 1
Given (21), the rural capital over land ratio at steady state is
Ka∞(s)/L∞(s) = [α(1− βL∞(s))/(ρ+ δ)]
1/(1−α) ,
which is unambiguously decreasing in L∞(s). Using lemma 2, Ka∞(s)/L∞(s)
is thus increasing in s. Using (21) also gives Kn∞ = [pηA/(ρ+ δ)]
1
1−η , which
is independent of s.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 2
Denote by ya∞(s) the steady state level of production of agricultural
goods, where
ya∞(s) = [α/(ρ+ δ)]
α
1−α [1− βL∞(s)]
1/(1−α) L∞(s). (E.1)
We have y￿a∞(s) = L
￿
∞
(s)dya∞(s)/dL, where
dya∞(s)
dL
=
￿
α(1− βL)
ρ+ δ
￿ α
1−α
￿
1−
2− α
1− α
βL
￿
.
Given 1−α
2−α
< ξ
1+ξ
< β using H1, ya∞(s) is increasing in L if L ≤
1−α
β(2−α)
,
whereas it is decreasing in L if 1−α
β(2−α)
≤ L. Using lemma 2 that states
L￿
∞
(s) < 0, the function ya∞(s) is concave in s and reaches a maximum for
the rate of transfer sA, given by sA =
(1−α)ρν
2−α
￿
α
(2−α)(ρ+δ)
￿ α
1−α
. Comparing sA
with s¯ (determined by L∞(s¯) = L0) gives
sA
s¯
=
(1− α)ρν
ξ − βL0(1 + ξ)
[(2− α)(1− βL0)
α]−1/(1−α) < 1.
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Using proposition 1 implies K ￿a∞(s) = L
￿
∞
(s)dKa∞(s)/dL, where
dKa∞(s)
dL
=
￿
α(1− βL)
ρ+ δ
￿ 1
1−α
￿
1−
βL
(1− α)(1− βL)
￿
, (E.2)
which is equal to zero for L = 1−α
β(2−α)
. Hence, Ka∞(s) is also concave in s and
reaches a maximum for the rate of transfer sA. The steady state agricultural
revenue net of investment also finds a maximum for sA because
y￿a∞(s)− δK
￿
a∞(s) = y
￿
a∞(s)[1− αδ/(ρ+ δ)], (E.3)
where the bracketed term is positive.
By definition (6), the steady state transfer is S(1 − L∞(s), 0) = γ −
γL∞(s) + Rdbas, which is an increasing function of s given s = γ + ρR and
L￿
∞
(s) < 0. Using (26) and keeping γ constant implies that (26) is a concave
function of s which finds a maximum for sC such that
y￿a∞(sC) =
ρ+ δ
ρ+ (1− α)δ
[γL￿
∞
(sC)− dbas/ρ] < 0.
Hence, sA < sC . Furthermore sC < s¯ iff y
￿
a∞(s¯)[1− αδ/(ρ + δ)]− γL
￿
∞
(s¯) +
dbas/ρ < 0, which leads to
dbas <
ρ(1− α)(1− βL0)s¯
β[(1− βL0)(1 + ξ)− α][ξ − βL0(1 + ξ)]
￿￿
1−
αδ
ρ+ δ
￿
[1− 2−α
1−α
βL0]s¯
ξ − (1 + ξ)βL0
− γ
￿
,
where the bracketed term is positive if γ is small compared to s¯, which is
the case assuming that γ is fixed. Otherwise, we have sC = s¯. Furthermore,
keeping R constant implies that (26) is a concave function of s iff￿
1−
αδ
ρ+ δ
￿
[1− 2−α
1−α
βL0]s¯
ξ − (1 + ξ)βL0
+ s
h￿￿(L)
(h￿(L))2
> 2,
which does not hold if s = 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for con-
cavity is −y￿￿a∞(s)[1 − αδ/(ρ + δ)] > d
2S(1 − L∞(s), 0)/ds
2. It requires that
the change in s is mostly driven by a change in R.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 3
(33) can be expressed as h˜(L)− (γ + rR)/n = 0, with r = ρ+ δ and
h˜(L) = [α(1− βL)/(ρ+ δ)]
α
1−α [ξa − βL (1/n+ ξa)] . (F.1)
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We have
h˜￿(L) = − β
1−α
￿
α(1−βL)
ρ+δ
￿ α
1−α
￿
1
n
+ ξa −
α
n(1−βL)
￿
,
which is negative if and only if L < (1−α+nξa)/[β(1+nξa)]. Using lemma 1
and nξa > ξa > ξ implies that h˜
￿(L) < 0 and that (33) has a unique solution
(L˜∞ ∈ [L0, 1]) for a given scheme (γ, R).
Comparing (B.1) with (F.1) implies that h˜(L0) > h(L0) iff βL0[1 − n +
nν(1−α)δ] < nν(1−α)δ, which holds for n > 1/[1− ν(1−α)δ]. Otherwise,
if n < 1/[1 − ν(1 − α)δ], lemma 1 implies L0 < ξ/[β(1 + ξ)], thus the
inequality also holds because ξ/(1+ ξ) < nν(1−α)δ/[1−n+nν(1−α)δ] for
n ≥ 1. h(L) finds a minimum (zero) for L∞ = ξ/[β(1 + ξ)], which is inferior
to L˜∞ = ξa/[β(1/n + ξa)] for which h˜(L) finds a minimum (zero) because
nξa > ξ. To prove that the functions h(L) and h˜(L) do not cross, I proceed by
contradiction. Hence, h(L) = h˜(L) for L∗ = nν(1−α)δ/[β(1−n+nν(1−α)δ)],
which is negative if n > 1/[1− ν(1−α)δ] and otherwise positive but leading
to h(L∗) < 0. Given a scheme (γ, R), h(L) < h˜(L) for all L ∈ [L0, L˜∞].
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